Candle auctions · uniform price · Robinhood Chain

Every buyer pays
the same price.

Candela launches tokens through one sealed moment of price discovery. Bids collect into a book, the book clears once at a single price, and whatever you didn't spend comes back. No first-block snipers, no gas wars, no bonding-curve ladder.

p* = max{ p ≥ reserve : Σmax ≥ p budget / p ≥ supply }

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Indicative price
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Committed
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Bids
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Bid in this round
Live auctions
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Bids in live books
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Committed now
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Rounds settled
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Mechanism

Four steps, one price

The book is open and visible the whole time, so everyone sees the same indicative price. What nobody controls is the exact moment it closes.

01 / BID

Budget + limit

You commit USDG and the highest price you'd accept. Order of arrival doesn't matter.

bid(budget: 500, maxPrice: 0.008)
02 / BOOK

Live demand curve

All bids form one curve. Its crossing with the fixed supply is the indicative price, updated with every bid.

demand(p) = Σ budget / p
03 / CLOSE

The candle goes out

After the scheduled end, the round closes at a hidden moment within 5 minutes. Last-second games stop paying.

close = end + H(seed) mod 300s
04 / SETTLE

One price, refunds

Bids above the price fill in full, the marginal level fills pro-rata, the rest is refunded. The pool opens at the same price.

tokens = spent / p*
Why "Candela"

An auction that ends when the flame does

Candela is Latin for candle. In 17th-century England, ships and goods were sold "by the candle". An inch of candle was lit when bidding opened, and the last bid standing when the flame died won. Nobody could tell the exact moment it would go out, so waiting for the final second was a gamble, not a strategy.

Candela brings that rule on-chain: every round has a scheduled end and then a hidden close somewhere in the next five minutes. Combined with one uniform price for every filled bid, there is no first block to snipe and no last block to game.

The two rules

Price
one for everyone
Order of arrival
irrelevant
Scheduled end
public
Actual close
hidden, +0–5 min
Bids after the close
refunded
Cancels
locked last 10 min
Same bids, two mechanisms

What a bonding curve does to the same crowd

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first-come bonding curve, same total raiseCandela

Replay of one round

Clearing price (everyone)
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Bonding curve · first buyer avg
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Bonding curve · last buyer avg
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Last vs first
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Sniper edge on a curve
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Sniper edge on Candela
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The bot buys 6% of the raise in block 1 of the curve and is valued at the clearing price. In a batch auction it would pay the same price as everyone else.

Rounds

On the board

All auctions →